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CONGRESS TAKES A LOOK AT A NO-FAULT PROPOSAL
FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: SOME OBSERVATIONS
THE PROBLEM
E VEN A CURSORY GLANCE at the news media in the recent past indicates that
problems in the area of medical malpractice are rising to turbulent
heights. For example, newspapers are increasingly printing long and passionate
letters-to-the-editor dispraising numerous circumstances and individualtypes,
which are allegedly the cause of the problem.' The primary development,
which caused the initiation of this storm, is the rising premium rate for
medical malpractice insurance.' The pinch on the physician's pocketbook has
resulted in outcries of frustration and anger from the medical community.
Objects of these attacks have included the insurance industry, the legal
profession, and the litigious nature of contemporary patients. Attorneys and
members of the insurance industry have responded with counter allegations
and justifications for the present state of affairs.
The main result of these interchanges has been the development of much
myth and misconception as to the nature of the medical malpractice problem.'
Nevertheless, a problem does exist. The premiums for medical malpractice
insurance have increased dramatically. The reason for this rise has been
attributed to a variety of causes, not the least being the growing number of
suits filed.' The increase in litigation has incurred difficulty for insurance
companies in the preparation of actuarial tables and in many instances has
I See, e.g., Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 23, 1975, at 3-AA, col. 1.
2 Many news articles offer figures to represent the magnitude of these premiums.
Geographical variations is one of the reasons for the disparity in the amount of
premiums. The following indicates maximum premiums for high risk medical profes-
sionals across the continental United States. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1974, at 50 ($20,000);
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 2, 1975, at 16-A, col. 2 ($47,000); N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1974 § 6 (Magazine), at 20, col. 2 ($14,000).
3 At the direction of the President, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
Elliot Richardson, established a Commission to study the medical malpractice situation.
This Commission prepared a report with a corresponding appendix offering its findings
and recommendations. HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S REPORT]. The Commission
arrived at a similar conclusion. SECRETARY'S REPORT, at 4.
If we accomplish nothing else, we will have achieved some degree of success if this
Report corrects some of the current misconceptions about the magnitude of the
problem and the fundamental causes and consequences of malpractice claims and
suits. The subject has spawned entirely too much rhetoric and speculation, most of
which has impeded the search for viable solutions.
See J. Brant, Medical Malpractice Insurance: The Disease and How to Cure It, 6
VALPARAISO UNIV. L. REV. 152 (1972); C. Havighurst & L. Tancredi, Medical Adversity
Insurance-A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974
INS. L.J. 69; J. King, Malpractice Prevention: A Bi-Professional Approach, 1971 INS.
L.J. 335; Comment, The Medical Malpractice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial
Department of New York: An Alternative to Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1974).
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made the providing of medical malpractice insurance unprofitable.' In addition,
the tendency toward larger damage recoveries has aggravated the overall situa-
tion, including the inter-professional conflict between attorneys and physicians.'
So much controversy has emanated from this broad range of difficulties
which make up the "problem," that professionals and lay people have met
across the country in an attempt to isolate the issues and develop solutions.7 A
variety of plans have been proposed which range from minor adjustments of
the present tort system to its complete abandonment.8 Three general normative
I C. Havighurst & L. Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance-A No-Fault Approach to
Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INS. L.J. 69; Comment, The Medical
Malpractice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial Department of New York: An
Alternative to Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 262 n.7 (1974). But see J. Brant, Medical
Malpractice Insurance: The Disease and How to Cure It, 6 VALPARAISO UNIV. L. REV.
152, at 161 (1972).
Much of the blame for the rising rates must rest with the insurance companies.
Although it is probably true that they were neither able to adequately anticipate
the rising number of claims nor to cope with the delays inherent in malpractice
litigation, they have been lax in developing new methods for risk selection, rate
making or prevention of claims.
See also TIME, May 5, 1975, at 82 (state legislatures are being forced to pass so-called
"band-aid" bills to provide emergency malpractice coverage where major insurers have
announced their imminent withdrawal from providing this type of service).
6 See, e.g., Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974)
(total damages awarded: $4,025,000.00). J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE
299 (1971). "What bothers many, including physicians, is the inference that jurors will
return hugely inflated money damage verdicts to ensure that the plaintiff has a sizeable
sum left after his attorney has skimmed off his agreed percentage." See NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 23, 1974, at 50.
1 The most notable of these efforts was the Secretary's Commission on Medical
Malpractice (see note 3 supra). This group was composed of lay people, attorneys,
physicians, and members of the insurance industry. They held hearings nationwide and
authorized the preparation of numerous research projects to arrive at the conclusions
contained in their report.
s A. Adler, Malicious Prosecution Suits as Counterbalance to Medical Malpractice Suits,
21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51 (1972) (within the context of the present tort system, this
approach contemplates a reduction of nuisance malpractice suits by subjecting the
unmeritorious claimant to possible civil liability for malicious prosecution); C. Havi-
ghurst & L. Trancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance-A No-Fault Approach to Medical
Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INS. L.J. 69 (a plan which would provide
scheduled payment to patients by private insurers for certain compensable events without
regard to the fault of the health service provider); Comment, The Medical Malpractice
Mediation Panel in the First Judicial Department of New York: An Alternative to
Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1974) (this plan utilizes screening panels under the
auspices of the Court before suits are prosecuted in an effort to eliminate the cost of suits
by unmeritorious claimants); Comment, Private Physician Unions: Federal Antitrust and
Labor Law Implications, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 983 (1973) (this comment discusses the
possibility of physicians' unions in order to create greater bargaining power with respect
to the establishment of malpractice rates). The alternatives suggested above are clearly
not exhaustive. A more complete listing would require explanation of the oftentimes
subtle distinctions capable of being drawn from the numerous different approaches. That
task is beyond the scope of this work.
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considerations, which guide the various proponents when they consider the
alternatives, can be isolated from these different approaches. First, most agree
that the high quality of medical care available in the United States today
should be maintained and improved. Second, the high cost of medical
malpractice insurance is not only a deterrent to some physicians in their
practice,' but it also increases the cost of medical treatment to all since these
costs are being passed on to the consumer-patient. Alternatives to the present
system must consider keeping at a minimum costs to the consumer-patient for
his medical care. Third, the common law tradition of providing civil redress
for harm suffered due to the negligent acts of others indicates that an
alternative plan must provide some form of recovery for the negligently
injured patient. These three considerations should be applied when analyzing
any proposed alternative to the present tort system."
THE PROPOSED PLAN
In recognition of the medical malpractice controversy, and undoubtedly in
response to complaints from numerous sectors of the American public, the
United States Congress has before it several proposals offering alternatives to
the current tort system. 1 For the purposes of this comment, only one of these
recent proposals will be examined. The bill offered by Senators Inouye and
Kennedy on January 17, 1975,12 represents a preliminary legislative attempt
to draft a no-fault medical insurance compensation plan. 3 This analysis will
9 This deterrent effect takes several forms. Semi-retired physicians may find the malprac-
tice insurance premiums prohibitive to the extent that full retirement is more economically
justifiable. Young physicians may encounter financial difficulties in their attempts to
establish solo practices in the sense of the traditional family physician, and be forced into
institutional attachments. See NEWSWEEK, March 10, 1975, at 56. Also, the malpractice
threat has been charged to varying degrees with the cost inflation from defensive
medicine. See Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine,
1971 DurE L.J. 939.
10 Clearly, there are a variety of sub-factors which must also be brought to bear in an
appropriate analysis, e.g., efficiency and justness of any revised system for legal redress
to the injured patient.
"I National Medical Malpractice Insurance and Arbitration Act of 1975, S. 482, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (January 29, 1975); National Medical Injury Compensation Insurance
Act of 1975, S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (January 17, 1975); Federal Medical Mal-
practice Insurance Act, S. 188, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (January 16, 1975).
12 National Medical Injury Compensation Insurance Act of 1975, S. 215, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (January 17, 1975) [hereinafter the bill will be cited as S. 215 with appropriate
section numbers following when necessary for clarity. The text can be found in the
Congressional Record for January 17, 1975].
13 It should be noted that the authors of the bill had not, at the time of its presentation,
entirely committed themselves to a preference for a no-fault approach. Senator Kennedy
remarked, on behalf of himself and Senator Inouye, upon the presentation of their
insurance and arbitration plan (see note 11 supra): "I have introduced two fundamentally
different proposals to deal with the rapidly worsening medical malpractice problem
because I wish to explore all sides of the issue and all possible solutions to the
problem ... " 121 CONG. REC. S1142 (January 29, 1975).
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use that proposal as a model for a discussion of the potential hazards which
might accompany attempts to establish, on a federal level, a no-fault medical
malpractice scheme. The mechanics of the bill will first be briefly explained.
Under the Inouye and Kennedy bill, the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare will be authorized to establish an insurance program for health
care providers.' Participation in the program by the providers will be entirely
voluntary, but subject to minimal requirements established in the bill. 5 In the
state where the provider practices, participation will be denied unless:
(1) the state licenses health professionals in accordance with the minimum
standards established in Part D of the bill;"6 (2) the state licenses health care
institutions in accordance with regulations established by the Secretary; and,
(3) Professional Standards Review Organizations have been designated
pursuant to the Social Security Act.' Participant providers must obviously
comply with these licensure requirements. In addition, physicians must meet
several other requirements to participate. They must submit to review by the
Professional Standards Review Organizations"' and they must accept payment
from Social Security recipients in accordance with the federal pay schedule.
Also, with respect to those surgical procedures designated by the Secretary, the
physician must consult with specialists in the area and obtain recommendation
for the surgery' 9 before proceeding.
After these requirements for the state and individual are met, then
the provider has the option of participating in the national insurance
program. Established in the Treasury of the United States will be a Medical
Injury Compensation Insurance Fund.2 ' The balance of the fund shall be
entirely credited from premiums paid by participating providers. The fund
shall be used to make all necessary payments required under the insurance
14 This group would include physicians, other health professionals, and health care
institutions. S. 215 § 1701.
15 S. 215 § 1704.
'6 S. 215 §§ 1731-33. Some of the major provisions include the following. All new
professionals must pass to the satisfaction of the Secretary an examination prepared by
the Secretary. All new professionals must demonstrate written and spoken proficiency
in the English language and any other requirements necessary to evaluate competence.
All professionals must be relicensed at least every six years in accordance with procedures
deemed appropriate by the Secretary. There will be no durational residency requirement
necessary for state licensure. The Secretary will periodically review the state procedures
to assure that they meet minimum federal requirements. Failure to meet these standards
will subject the state to termination of participation in the insurance program.
17 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-1 (1974). The draft of the bill contains reference here to § 1152
of Title 42, but this is not where the authorization for the Professional Standards Review
Organizations is to be found in the United States Code.
18 See note 17 supra.
19 This particular procedure will be controlled in more detail by regulations which the
Secretary will establish.
20 S. 215 § 1702.
COMMENT
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss1/5
AKRON LAW REVIEW
contracts and to pay the necessary administrative expenses of carrying
out the insurance program. 2 1
The type of incident which will be insured under this plan will be both
justifiable no-fault and tort claims. When a patient of an insured is injured, he
will have an option to proceed under the no-fault scheme or the traditional
tort route." In any event, if the provider knows of an injury to a patient which
would be compensable under the no-fault side, he must so notify the patient
within a given time." Failure to notify the patient so that he does not file his
no-fault claim within the required time 24 will result in the insured's loss of
his insurance benefits. In other words, the provider will then be personally
liable for the amount the patient would have been entitled to recover had he
filed a timely claim.2' The amounts of these no-fault recoveries will be
determined according to the guidelines established in the bill. 6 As stated
before, the patient will also have available to him the traditional tort route,
but this approach is precluded if a no-fault claim is filed.27
Other characteristics which do not fall within the above explanation are
included in the bill, and it is necessary to elucidate them in order to
understand fully the impact of the proposal, if it becomes law. The role of
the Advisory Council on Medical Injury Compensation will be to advise the
21 What will be included in these administrative costs is not entirely clear from the bill.
Initially it will require at least payments to the Advisory Council on Medical Injury
Compensation (see S. 215 § 1724). In addition, the Secretary is required to make findings
of fact and decisions on the claim of any individual under the no-fault plan (S. 215 §
1715). This task will probably require the establishment of boards across the nation as a
matter of administrative necessity in order to handle the determination of all claims in a
somewhat efficient manner. Payment will be required for this nationwide system. These
are two obvious administrative expenses but they are probably not exhaustive of all that
will be necessary in light of the nationwide nature of this program and the mammoth
task which will confront the administrative agents.
22 There are two significant aspects to the no-fault side. First, the injured patient must
bring his claim within a given period of time (S. 215 § 1716). Secondly, the provider
must also furnish the Secretary with information necessary to determine whether payment
is due on the claim S. 215 § 1705.
23 The provider must notify the patient of the compensable event within 30 days after he
knew or reasonably should have known of the injury S. 215 § 1705(c) (2).
24 The patient must file his initial no-fault claim no later than 18 months after he knew
or should have known of the injury S. 215 § 1716.
25S. 215 § 1705(c) (2).
26 S. 215 H9 1711-14. These recoveries will be limited to a specified strata of economic
losses in addition to traditional noneconomic losses recoverable under tort law (but not
including punitive or exemplary damages). An interesting change to most existing legal
measures is a required reduction for collateral sources of recovery stemming from the
injury (but not to be reduced by life insurance or Social Security benefits).
27 S. 215 § 1717. No claim for no-fault benefits will be accepted without a written waiver
of rights to tort recovery. Once this waiver is signed, and if the patient subsequently
does bring a tort action, the Secretary will then be authorized to bring suit for breach.
The amount of liquidated damages will be any recovery from the tort action.
[Vol. 9:1
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Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on the establishment and
operation of the program."8 This 15-member Council, composed of no less
than seven health professionals, will undoubtedly have -a profound effect on
the exact nature of the plan in operation. From a legal perspective, this
Council's effect will initially be most notable in the area of establishing rules
of evidence and standards of proof for the no-fault hearings which will
determine whether compensation is justified. The bill authorizes 9 whatever
evidentiary standards are deemed appropriate in order to present the no-fault
claimant a fair opportunity to prove his case for compensation. The proposal
also establishes guidelines for the payment of reasonable attorney's fees based
on time expended, regardless of whether the claim is no-fault or tort." The
Council will again be instrumental in establishing the specific rates under these
guidelines. Finally, the bill includes an anti-fraud provision,"' which makes a
misdemeanor12 the misrepresentation of any material fact by claimant or
insured with respect to compensation or insurance recovery."
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN
Before any discussion of specific problems, it must first be explained that
this "no-fault" approach is not a system premised on a total disregard of fault
before compensation is afforded. It therefore will not be no-fault in the pure
sense. Since participation in the plan is voluntary, there will undoubtedly be
instances where fault will have to be determined in order to ascertain whether
no-fault benefits are available. The situation is certain to arise where a patient
is injured in a large non-federally insured (no-fault) medical institution and at
the approximate time of injury he was treated by several health care
professionals, only some of whom were covered by the national no-fault
insurance. In order to determine whether the injured patient merits
28 S. 215 §§ 1703, 1724. In addition to advice on all necessary regulations, this Council
will specifically play an important role in establishing (a) premium rates, (b) loss-
deductible for tort liability, (c) limitations of coverage and (d) general terms of
insurability.
29 S. 215 § 1723.
30 S. 215 § 1726(b). "No part of such no-fault benefits or tort damages may be applied
in any manner as attorney's fees in connection with such claim or action to recover such
damages." A violation of this provision by an attorney will subject the lawyer to
misdemeanor charges (a fine not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both).
31 S. 215 § 1727.
"'2 The penalty upon conviction will be a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both.
33 Participating providers will also be subject to another type of criminal liability.
S.215 § 1727(4).
Whoever-(4) in the case of a health professional or health care institution,
knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false statement or
representation respecting the participation of such professional or institution in
the insurance program established under this title, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor....
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no-fault benefits the administrators of the no-fault program will again be back
in the business of determining fault in order to ascertain whether the injury
suffered was the result of health care services provided by an insured.
Variations of the above fact pattern, which would not be unusual, will
expose more of the same problem. At least to this extent, the no-fault system
will be a fault system not unlike the present system. In addition, the
development of parameters within which compensable events will be situated
may require a resort to fault concepts in order to place some limitations on the
types of injuries for which payment will be made. Since the system provides for
hearings to decide whether no-fault claims merit recovery,14 the proposal
implicitly recognizes that some injuries related to health care are not
compensable. Some standards will be necessary in order to make this
determination, and common law fault concepts will be readily available to
provide guidelines for what should be compensable. 3 This factor may also
tend to make the system less no-fault and provide it with a more fault-oriented
conceptual framework.
Now an attempt will be made to isolate some of the major potential
problems with a plan of this nature." There is no convenient order for the
presentation of these observations, but the nature of this forum indicates
the propriety of an initial focus on possible legal entanglements.
The requirement that the provider notify the patient within 30 days of a
compensable event offers a time-bomb of problems.3 " To begin, the definitions
of compensable events in the area of medical injuries will not be easily
developed. 8 Notwithstanding this difficulty, during the bill's initial operation,
34 S. 215 § 1715(l) (a).
35 The following cases illustrate what a compensable event has been at common law.
Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948) (21 ' by 11 2' -towel left in
stomach after abdominal surgery); Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P.2d 955 (1961)
(administration of anesthesia which totally incapacitated a previously able-bodied man);
Wolfsmith v. Marsh, 51 Cal. 2d 832, 337 P.2d 70 (1959) (improper hypodermic
injection of sodium pentathol which caused phlebitis in the knee area); Wooten v. Curry,
50 Tenn. App. 549, 362 S.W.2d 820 (Ct. App. 1962) (vagina closing after hysterectomy
is prima facie negligence-the court also permitted joinder of suit by husband with this
action); Sheffield v. Runner, 163 Cal. App. 2d 48, 328 P.2d 828 (1958) (failure to
hospitalize patient suffering simultaneously from bronchial pneumonia and chicken pox).
36 Dependent upon one's point of view, the "major" problems may appear to be quite
different. This discussion will attempt to be as objective as possible with respect to the
plan's workability in light of the present legal structure and serious nature of the present
malpractice problem.
-7 See text accompanying notes 23 and 24 supra.
38 The Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice recognized this problem when
they indicated "the enormous difficulty of determining the threshold of compensa-
bility that all too often is overlooked, particularly by those who facilely suggest a no-fault
compensation system for medically injured persons comparable to some of the auto-
mobile no-fault plans which have been proposed or adopted." SECRETARY'S REPORT at
[Vol. 9:1
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the only definitional guideline established will be "any injury suffered as a
result of health care services provided by an insured."3 Even assuming that
valid definitions of compensable events can be developed, there will be an
uncomfortable period of time where all involved will not know where they
stand until a wide spectrum of decisions is rendered."0 The physician
particularly will be cornered and confused since his very insurance coverage
is dependent upon timely notification.
Another aspect of this notification requirement is the development of
evidentiary problems.' Although this notification may never acquire the
technical status of an admission of liability, its probative value cannot be
underestimated. Given the context of this plan, the notification will have
ramifications two-fold. On the no-fault side, the notification's ("admission's")
probative value, tending to indicate the possibility of some negligent activity,
may easily result in a greater number of no-fault recoveries. "2 On the tort
side, this notification takes on greater proportions. First, it must be remembered
that the provider is encouraged to notify in order to maintain his no-fault
coverage. It is conceivable that even questionable cases will result in
notification due to this systemic pressure. Yet its probative value remains
unchanged. If this notification were admitted into evidence at trial, the question
of fair adjudication, particularly by jury, comes into issue. Undoubtedly, the
rules of evidence will develop to exclude this notification 3 as unfairly
prejudicial, but the battle to keep it out of court will be never-ending,
particularly since the plaintiff is the party who was notified."
One of the probable reasons that the notification provision was included
in the bill arises from the discontent, particularly by defendant physicians,
with the ever-broadening application of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice
101. Contra, C. Havighurst & L. Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance-A No-Fault
Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INS. L.J. 69.
-
9 S. 215 § 1711.
4
1The number of decisions necessary to provide some degree of certainty will be
numerous due to the complex nature of medical treatment. Many debatable and fine lines
will have to be drawn. Doctors agree on the subtle necessities of their art no more than
lawyers.
41 As a matter of discovery under the tort system, evidence of physician negligence has
been almost impossible to acquire since the physician is oftentimes the only party who
has the requisite knowledge concerning the negligence issue, and his liability is on the
line. The tort system has responded to this difficulty with an expansion of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. See J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 88 (1971).
Developers of no-fault plans have responded to this problem with the notification
requirement. C. Havighurst & L. Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance-A No-Fault
Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INS. L.J. 69.
42 This point goes to the cost issue. See text accompanying note 70 infra.
43 S. 215 § 1705(C) (3) (B) (notification section) "Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to affect the tort liability of any insured."
44 This factor may also go to the cost issue. See text accompanying note 70 infra.
COMMENT
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss1/5
AKRON LAW REVIEW
cases. 5 In these types of cases, the factual patterns often develop where the
defendant health care provider is the only party in a position to know what
actually occurred. In these situations, res ipsa loquitur is invoked creating a
presumption of negligence and thus shifting the burden of going forward to
the defendant in order to provide the missing factual information. 4' The
complaints about the use of this doctrine arise from those situations where
the procedure has been so loosely applied that not only the burden of going
forward has shifted to the defendant but also the burden of persuasion. The
defendant health care provider is then placed in the position of proving to
the jury that there was no negligence. Critics of the present system claim
that this result creates an unfair advantage for plaintiffs thus permitting more
judgments against defendant health care providers. '
However, assuming arguendo the validity of this complaint against res
ipsa loquitur, the notification requirement contained in the proposed bill does
not appear to be a viable solution."8 As indicated above, this provision may
create more prejudicial problems than it solves. A judicious application of
res ipsa loquitur" may be more useful in determining liability, or even whether
the no-fault provider was the party who administered the treatment in
question. This traditional tort approach leaves more discretion to the jury, but
it may be more desirable than establishing a procedure where a notification
motivated by a desire to preserve one's insurance coverage creates an even
stronger probative inference of some degree of culpability.5"
Other evidentiary problems are raised in the bill by the section"' which
authorizes the Secretary, upon the recommendations of the Advisory Council
on Medical Injury Compensation, to establish rules of evidence and proofs
appropriate to determine the rights of beneficiaries under the no-fault side.
However, since this type of authorization is granted to many administrative
45 See note 41 supra.
48 The classic example is surgery. Here the injured patient is unconscious when the
alleged negligent activity occurs. Only the health care providers are available to provide
information as to what happened at that time.
4 ""[A]pplication of the principle is limited, theoretically, to those cases where a jury
does not need the assistance of an expert witness to discern negligence." J. WALTZ & F.
INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, at 90 (1971).
48 Another attempt to formulate a no-fault plan considered and rejected a notification
requirement as "not operable." E. Roth & P. Rosenthal, Non-Fault Based Medical Injury
Compensation Systems, SECRETARY'S REPORT (Appendix), at 464.
49Notwithstanding the fact that this docirine has come under severe attack by the
medical community, it appears to be a more appropriate approach.
50 This discussion does not even handle the issue of failure to notify for what the provider
deems adequate reason. This unknowing, or possibly unknowable, culpable omission may
also create strong probative inferences of liability in fact, i.e., the provider may be
viewed as a participant in a cover-up attempt.
51 S. 215 § 1723.
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agencies for the operation of their hearings, the broad discretion granted
and its incumbent problems have been handled previously.12 This approach
does not offer new evidentiary problems, although it is not certain that the
old problems have been resolved to the satisfaction of all.
The availability of the Administrative Procedure Act" provides a
credible guideline as to how evidence questions will be handled, particularly
when courts review the Secretary's decisions as to whether an event is
compensable on the no-fault side.5" If this no-fault plan were to become
law, the operation of other agencies with respect to the admission of
evidence would indicate that the standards for admission at a no-fault hearing
would not be stringent.
The movement continues to be toward relaxing the rigidity of the
jury-trial rules, toward admitting evidence in administrative proceedings
without considering such rules, and toward basing findings on the kind
of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in
serious affairs even if it would be inadmissible in a jury case.5
This procedure, which approaches a "let-everything-in" standard, may have
ramifications in the medical malpractice area not analogous to the purpose
for which other agencies were established.
In terms of a solution to the medical malpractice problem, this broad
evidentiary latitude may offer difficulties with respect to the very purpose for
which the plan is offered. This grant of discretion will have to be guided down
a very narrow path in order to preserve two mandates necessary to maintain
the viability of this national insurance alternative as preferential over the tort
system. On one side, a criticism of the tort approach is that meritorious but
small claims do not receive their day in court because of the contingent fee
system.5" No-fault is intended to alleviate this problem. Therefore, restrictive
evidentiary rules for the no-fault hearings could work a great disservice to the
52 See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 836 (2d ed. 1972).
53 5 U.S.C.A. § 500 (1967).
51 The bill clearly provides for review of the Secretary's decisions. S. 215 § 1715(a) (2).
This position is in accord with the tenor of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 702 (1967). "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof." Accord, Comment. Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions in Ohio, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 853 (1973).
55 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 14.01, at 840 (Supplement 1970). See
also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
56 SECRETARY'S REPORT at 33. "Our study data showed that the contingent fee system
tends to discourage the acceptance of legally meritorious malpractice cases involving
minor injury and relatively small potential recovery, and we view this as a wholly
undesirable and unfair result of the system."
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purpose of the plan by denying meritorious claims adequate access to
no-fault benefits.
On the other hand, the present tort system is severely condemned for its
costs, particularly by way of insurance premiums for providers. Evidentiary
standards for the no-fault hearings which "let everything in" could possibly
create unnecessary prejudice against the provider's activity and spur no-fault
compensation in questionable cases. This effect will merely increase the costs
by way of premiums for the entire national insurance system, a result which
the present dilemma indicates should be discouraged. In these respects, the
standards of evidence developed for the operation of the no-fault hearing
could have substantive ramifications in contradiction to the goals of no-fault
as an alternative to the present system.
Beyond such potential evidentiary problems, 7 there exist broader issues
which arise from provisions based on policy decisions. These are, (1) the
abolition of the contingent fee system for all medical injury suits, and (2)
the mandatory extensive licensure procedures for health care providers. The
contingent fee system has been under attack from several directions. It has
been charged, particularly by the medical community, with the promotion of
unnecessary suits against providers with unconscionably high prayers for
damages.? It has been condemned for not providing small but meritorious
claims with adequate legal counsel, if any is provided at all."0 The contingent
fee is the primary alleged culprit for wiping out a substantial proportion of
the recovery that an injured person does receive."0 These criticisms, although
their validity remains suspect, probably were instrumental in providing the
impetus for its abolition in the proposed bill.6"
Again, the success of this alteration will depend upon the nature of the
regulations expounded by the Secretary for the payment of attorneys who
5' As indicated above (see text accompanying note 51 supra) evidentiary problems with
respect to administrative agencies have already been confronted. However, it should be
noted that the bill's provision for appeal to United States district courts again presents
problems as to exactly what the courts can review by the way of facts presented in
evidence. The substantial evidence rule may run into rough waters upon the review of
technical medical disputes upon which there may be little agreement in the medical
community. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 846 (2d ed. 1972).
5o This allegation, except perhaps in a few unusual circumstances, has been rejected by
the authorities who have studied the situation in relation to the medical malpractice
problem. SECRETARY'S REPORT at 33-34; G. Annos, Medical Malpractice: Are the
Doctors Right? 10 TRIAL July-Aug. 59 (1974); see J. Brant, Medical Malpractice
Insurance: The Disease and How to Cure It, 6 VALPARAISO UNIV. L. REV. 152, 162
(1972).
f9 See note 55 supra.
Go SECRETARY'S REPORT at 34; see J. Brant, Medical Malpractice Insurance: The Disease
and How to Cure It, 6VALPARAISO UNIV. L. REV. 152, 162 (1972).
11 S. 215 § 1726.
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handle medical injuries cases. There can be little doubt that the prospect of
a large fee for a medical malpractice case is indeed an incentive for readily
available legal counsel. At the same time, it appears to be generally accepted
that small meritorious claims are not receiving adequate legal attention. 2 If
these are the only effects that the contingent fee system has on medical
malpractice litigation, then its abolishment and replacement with fee regulation
would not be so difficult. The Secretary will have to find a fee schedule for
hourly work which will attract sufficient numbers of attorneys to handle the
claims but not provide them windfalls as the tort system is accused of doing.
The above fee payment system seems appropriate if the premises accepted
are exclusive, but the contingency fee system serves another function. That
system provides attorneys with an incentive to turn down unmeritorious cases
regardless of how high an alleged recovery might be.63 This screening function
is valuable, in terms of the entire system, through its effect in keeping systemic
costs down (e.g., defense costs which create inflationary pressures on insurance
premiums). This cost-saving device has not been replaced in the no-fault
system. Any marginally potential claim can be filed, thus forcing the expense
of administrative costs just to reject it.64 This cost will eventually reach the
consumer-patient. Instead of the patient paying his attorney to be told that he
has an unmeritorious claim, all patients will pay their health care providers.
The increased administrative expenses necessary to turn down the unmeritori-
ous claims will raise the provider's insurance, a cost which he will pass on
to his patients. This system does not have the merit of isolating these
administrative costs to the unmeritorious claimant as does the contingency
fee tort system. Consequently, the overall effect of the contingency fee
abolition may not be a reduction in systematic health care costs, but rather
another impetus to increase these costs to all.6"
The licensure of health care providers presents difficulties of an entirely
different nature and will only be handled briefly. In order for health care
providers to participate in the national insurance they must be licensed subject
62 See note 55 supra.
63 G. Annos, Medical Malpractice: Are the Doctors Right? 10 TRIAL July-Aug. 59
(1974). "The simple fact that 30% of nothing is nothing usually means that the
contingency fee system actually serves to protect the physician by making the lawyer's
office a place where weak or unfounded cases are screened out."
64 Actual fraudulent claims will be deterred by the bill due to criminal sanctions contained
therein. S. 215 § 1727. However, as any hypochondriac knows, proof of fraud with
respect to claimed physical ailments is difficult.
65 Nevertheless, it does appear from this analysis that the problem of the meritorious
small claimant and his struggle to find legal representation does seem to be solved,
provided that the Secretary's fee schedule is sufficient to attract attorneys for any medical
malpractice case.
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to minimum national requirements which will be established by the Secretary."6
All new professionals will be required to pass a written examination, in
addition to other necessary criteria to evaluate competency. Notwithstanding
the ambiguity of this mandate, the entrance of the federal government into
possible detailed control of the medical profession is ripe with potential for
abuse. Undoubtedly, the reason for the proposal of this broad grant of
regulatory power is premised upon an envisioned new necessity, once civil
liability is effectively reduced, to control the irresponsible members of the
medical profession. This new need under no-fault may indeed be a valid
perception. The question then becomes one of means rather than ends. Passing
examinations seems to be a poor substitute for testing the competency and
responsibility of practicing health care professionals." Perhaps the solution
is to require local peer review with actual power to effectively police the
profession, and the requirement to use this power under government auspices."
The bill does evidence aspects of such an approach, but its emphasis is
improperly placed on licensure.
The last problem which will be discussed is perhaps already apparent.
It appears the proposal will be costly.69 Initially, it must be reiterated that
the primary aggravant of the present medical malpractice situation is the high
level of malpractice insurance premiums."" Whether one believes that the
premiums, whatever they might be, are proportionately too high with respect
to an individual provider's income, is really not the issue. The question, when
one is attempting to revise an entire system, is whether the systemic costs can
be reduced or at least maintained at the same level." As the previous discussion
of other potential problems illustrates, they almost all aggravate the
costs of the national insurance program."' For example, the provider notice
requirement has a potential to create more claims for no-fault benefits and
the possibility of more recoveries in tort. Also, the abolition of the contingency
fees eliminates an individually paid screening device for unmeritorious claims
and replaces it with a systemically paid screening device.
66 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
67 Cf. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68 The courts should always be available for review of these decisions so the peer review
committees do not turn into anything but peer review committees, in a professional
sense. The problem with giving peer review committees more power is simply that they
will have more power. Abuse of this power for personal or political reasons should be
discouraged and controlled.
69 The particular cost aggravants which were discussed previously are of a different nature
than the systemic costs which will be discussed. The latter are costs which are inherent in
the very proposal itself, viewed from a perspective of the entire system.7 0 See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
71 If costs are to remain at the same level, the necessity for alternative plans only makes
sense if other crucial areas are being improved.
12 See text accompanying notes 42, 55, & 64 supra.
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Besides these individual cost aggravants, the entire system by its
nature is destined to be costly. The Secretary's Commission concluded
with respect to no-fault that:
... such system is bound to be more costly than the present one to the
extent that it compensates injured persons whom the present system
excludes either because their injuries were not due to negligence or
because they are unable to prove negligence. The amount of the addi-
tional costs cannot be measured, but it is certain to be considerable."3
The very theory of no-fault indicates greater cost and, notwithstanding the
reluctance of the Secretary's Commission, others have been willing to say how
much. These estimates range from eight times74 to several hundred times 75 as
expensive as the present system for the patient-consumer. It would seem that
the no-fault approach will not be able to keep costs at their present level.
CONCLUSION
The beginning of this comment indicated three primary considerations
necessary to evaluate alternative medical compensation systems. The first
of these was maintenance and improvement of the present high standard of
medical care. The discussion of the proposed bill indicated that the licensure
techniques were of questionable validity for this purpose."7 The issue remains
as to whether this bill will at least maintain present medical standards. One
authority indicates doubt: "[S]uch a system.., would not only eliminate all
quality control mechanisms, but could even tend to encourage sloppiness.""
However, this bill has made attempts to maintain some degree of quality by
requiring physicians, against whom numerous benefits have been recovered, to
come under review and be subject to discipline." That this approach would
be efficacious in maintaining present standards is true to the extent that the
present system has similar provisions on the local level. Yet it is doubtful that
the present standard of medical care is dependent solely upon disciplinary
review. Numerous factors, beyond the scope of this work, significantly affect
the present standard of health care (e.g., educational standards, professional
self-image, and research funds). No conclusion will be drawn here as to what
" SECRETARY'S REPORT at 101.
74 G. Annos, Medical Malpractice: Are the Doctors Right? 10 TRIAL July-Aug. 59, 62
(1974).
75 SECRETARY'S REPORT at 133 (Separate Statement of Richard M. Markus, LL.B.).
76 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
77 G. Annos, Medical Malpractice: Are the Doctors Right? 10 TRIAL July-Aug. 59, 62
(1974). This conclusion concerning sloppiness is based on the notion that no-fault would
effectively remove civil liability. Without other controls, it is argued, that providers
would then have no incentive to avoid negligence beyond their own professional dedication.
78 S. 215 § 1704.
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effect a bill of this type would have on standards of health care, but the issue
merits further research before any laws are passed.
The second consideration for evaluation of an alternative plan is whether
redress will be provided for the negligently injured patient. It goes without
further comment that this bill will offer this aspect. The final consideration is
whether the costs to the consumer-patient will be kept to a minimum. The
previous discussion 79 indicates that this criterion will not be met, at least in
relationship to the costs of the present tort system. The only conclusion that
can be drawn from the application of these considerations and the above
discussion of detailed problems, is that the no-fault plan offered by Senators
Inouye and Kennedy is not a preferable alternative system. The cost issue
alone mandates the rejection of this plan.8"
The Congress should direct its search for solutions elsewhere or make
major revisions in the proposed no-fault approach.8 Particularly, since this
potentially costly plan also provides for voluntary participation by health care
providers, a passed law of this nature may be a dinosaur at its birth because
its high costs and marginal benefits will reduce its participants to a minimum.
Other proposed alternatives are available, such as arbitration and medical
screening panels, and those who seek solutions to the present difficulty might
be wise to focus their energies on these.8"
DAVID E. BEITZEL
79 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
11 121 CONG. REC. S420 (January 17, 1975). Senator Kennedy stated: "The bill proposes
that this program be entirely self-supporting through premium income at no additional
cost to the taxpayer." This may be true for the average person when he wears his taxpayer
hat, but when he wears his patient hat the costs will definitely increase.
"I This author has not found a no-fault plan which does not increase the costs in the final
analysis to the recipients of health care treatment. E. Roth & P. Rosenthal, Non Fault
Based Medical Injury Compensation Systems, SECRETARY'S REPORT (Appendix), at 450;
C. Havighurst & L. Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance-A No-Fault Approach to
Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INs. L.J. 69.
82 SECRETARY'S REPORT at 87.
In the final analysis it is the human interaction between all categories of health-
care providers and patients that will determine the measure of success in the
treatment process. We believe that increasing the degree of mutual understanding,
courtesy, and respect between patients and health care providers will greatly reduce
the antagonisms, misunderstandings, and dissatisfactions which all too often prompt
patients to turn to malpractice litigation.
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